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RECENT DECISIONS
COR'ORATIONs-AurHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT To BnNG SUIT WHEN THE BoARD
oF DIRcoR is DEADtocxx.m-A corporate defendant was alleged to have breached
an exclusive sales contract with the plaintiff corporation and certain individual defendants were charged with having induced the breach. The president of the plaintiff
corporation called a meeting of its board of directors for the purpose of considering
the advisability of instituting suit. The four directors comprising plaintiff's board were
evenly divided, one half of them, father and brother of the individual defendants,
voting not to sue and the other two directors, including the president, voting in favor
of a suit. Plaintiff's president, nevertheless, retained an attorney and instituted suit
in the name of the corporation. Special Term granted the defendants' motion to set
aside service of the summons and complaint; the Appellate Division reversed, two
justices dissenting, and upon further appeal, the following certified questibn was submitted to the Court of Appeals: "On the facts appearing in the record, should the
summons and complaint herein and the service thereof upon the moving defendants
have been vacated and set aside upon the ground that the plaintiff corporation did
not authorize the institution or prosecution of this action?" Held, order of the Appellate Division reversed on the ground that the president of a corporation may not
institute an action on behalf of the corporation under the circumstances disclosed in
the record. Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N. Y. 483 (1949).
Agreement upon the meaning of the adjectives commonly used to describe the
various types of authority possessed by an agent-in this case the president of a
corporation-is necessary to prevent confusion since the same adjective is frequently
used to describe different types of authority. Express authority is that conferred by
the bylaws of the corporation or by the action of the board of directors.' Implied,
or as it is sometimes called inferred, authority is that which may be inferred from the
circumstantial evidence, i.e., the facts-; for instance, from the acquiescence of the
directors in the prior exercise of certain powers by the president.0 Presumptive, or
as it is more often called prinza fade, authority is the authority usually and customarily
exercised by the president of a corporation. All true presumptions merely serve as
substitutes for evidence and, therefore, the presumption of authority need be resorted to only where there is no evidence of express or implied authority. The pre1. Section 60 of the N. Y. SiocK CORP. LAw provides that the directors may appoint
officers "who shall respectively have such powers and perform such duties in the management of the property and affairs of the corporation, subject to the control of the director.,
as may be prescribed by them or in the bylaws."
2. In 1 MacHEm, AGEncY § 708 (2d ed. 1914) the author points out: "The authority,
if implied at all, can only be implied from facts. It is not to be created by mere presumption, nor by any abstract considerations, however potent, that it could be expedient
or proper or convenient that the authority should exist. The facts, moreover, must be
those for which the principal is responsible. The authority if it exists at all must find its
source in the act or acquiescence of the principal, either expressed or implied. If such a
source cannot be shown, the authority cannot exist." See Bickford v. Meiner, 107 N. Y.
490, 14 N. E. 438 (1887).

3. Trmxler v. Minneapolis Cedar & Lumber Co., 128 Minn. 295, 150 N. W. 914 (1915)
(attorney retained by president had acted as defense attorney for the corporation in prior
matters); Potter v. N. Y. Infant Asylum, 44 Hun 367 (N. Y. 1887) (president was a lawyer and had often engaged lawyers to assist him; board of directors never consulted in.
advance); cf., Smith v. McKee, 55 S. D. 572, 226 N. W. 766 (1929).
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sumption disappears, of course, where there is evidence of an express or implied negation of authority.4 Since this type of presumed authority is inferred (i.e., implied)
from what is usual and customary, it is often referred to as implied authority. Another type of authority, often called implied authority, may be described with more
semantic discrimination as incidental authority, i.e., that authority which is reasonably necessary to carry out the authority expressly or impliedly conferred.
All of the above types of authority are actual authority and are to be distinguished
from apparent authority, upon which persons outside a corporation have a right to
rely because the corporation (the principal) has given to the president (the agent)
0
the appearances of authority. In a case such as the principal one where no rights of
third persons are involved, no question of apparent authority is involved.
The New York courts have gone so far as to hold that the president of a corporation, having full personal charge of its business, has prima facie as well as incidental7
authority to perform any act which the board of directors could authorize or ratify.
Where neither the bylaws nor positive action or acquiescence by the board of directors have granted to the president general charge of the corporate business, the authority to do a particular act must rest upon either a presumption of authority or must
be found incidental to the exercise of an authority expressly or impliedly conferred.
The management and control of the business affairs of a corporation is vested
8
primarily in its board of directors. Like any other principal, a board of directors
may delegate to agents of its own appointment the performance of any act which the
board itself can perform. The duties of the board, therefore, have frequently been

4.

Doheny v. Lacy, 168 N. Y. 213, 220, 61 N. E. 255, 257 (1901); 12 FoRD. L. Rav.

185, 187 (1943).

5.

"..

. our courts have held that the president of a corporation, as such, may, without

special authority, perform all the acts, which either because of usage or necessity are incidental to his office, and may bind the corporation by contracts arising in the usual
course of its business." Elblum Holding Corp. v. Mintz, 120 N. J. L. 604, 607, 1 A. 2d
204, 206 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (italics supplied). See 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 559 (perm.
ed. 1931).
6. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 8 (1934) defines apparent authority as the "power of an
apparent agent to affect the legal relations of an apparent principal with respect to a third
person by acts done in accordance with such principal's manifestations of consent to such
third person that such agent shall act as his agent."
7. Hardin v. Morgan Lithograph Co., 247 N. Y. 332, 338, 168 N. E. 388, 390 (1928);
Hastings v. Brooklyn Life Insurance Co., 138 N. Y. 473, 479, 34 N. E. 288, 291 (1893);
CLARK, CORPORATIONS § 195 (3d ed. 1923). In Schwartz v. Merchants & Manufacturers,
Inc., 72 F. 2d 256, 258 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) Judge Hand, after reviewing the New York decisions, is of the opinion that the decisions do not support so far reaching a rule as stated
above. He is of the opinion "that whatever powers are usual in the business may be assumed to have been granted; but the presumption stops there. . .. .
8. N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAw § 27 reads in part: "The business of a corporation shall be
. " See Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum &
managed by its board of directors. .
Transport Co., 293 N. Y. 281, 56 N. E. 2d 705 (1944), motion for reargument denied, 293
N. Y. 763, 57 N. E. 841 (1944); Matter of Leventall, 241 App. Div. 277, 271 N. Y. Supp.
493 (1934); 9 FLETcHER, CORPORATIONS § 4216 (perm. ed. 1931).
9. Hoyt v. Thompson's Ex'rs, 19 N. Y. 207, 216 (1859). After declaring that the board
of directors is possessed of authority to delegate its duties, the court goes on to say: "The
recognition of this principle is absolutely necessary in the affairs of every corporation whose
powers are vested in a board of directors. Without it, the most ordinary business could
not be carried on, and the corporate powers could not be executed."
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delegated to the president as the chief executive officer of the corporation, since the
complexities of modem business have made it a virtual impossibility for a board of
directors to carry out each of its duties unaided. The authority thus delegated to
the president by the board of directors is in addition to his express powers as set forth
in the corporate bylaws, and may be conferred either by an affirmative vote of the
board of directors, 10 or inferred from the continued exercise of powers acquiesced
in by the board."

A majority of the courts have held that the president of a corporation has prima

fade authority to institute suits in the name of the corporation,' 2 to appear in pending actions and to put in defenses,' 3 to waive legal delays, 14 to accept service of
process, 15 and to engage an attorney in the name of the corporation. O A minority
view maintains that the powers of the president are very limited. In these jurisdictions,' 7 the president is deemed to possess only those powers which are expressly conferred upon him in the bylaws or by the express orders of the board of directors.
There is apparently no recognition of implied or prima fade authority, the president being required to submit to the board, for its approval, any matter on vhich he
contemplates action and for which he has not received express authority.
While there is considerable authority for the proposition that the president of a
corporation has prima fade authority to institute suit and retain counsel in the name
of the corporation,' 8 few cases have dealt with the situation when the board of directors is evenly split on the matter. In the case of Regal Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v.
Merlis,'9 the president of the corporation was held to have authority to file an answer
to an involuntary petition in bankruptcy brought by two directors who were creditors
of the corporation and who were dissatisfied with the conduct of the business. The
board of directors had been evenly split. The court stated: "If the company is
solvent, for the president not to prevent such a result might cause irremediable in10. Lydia Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 298 Mass. 53, 9 N. E. 2d 573 (1937) (passing
of a special resolution by the board vesting the president with general charge of the
business).
11. See note 3 supra.
12. Dent v. People's Bank of Imboden, 118 Ark. 157, 175 S. W. 1154 (1915); Reno Water
Co. v. Leete, 17 Nev. 203, 30 Pac. 702 (1882).
13. Application of Bernheimer, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 300 (1943), aff'd, 266 App. Div. 868, 43
N. Y. S. 2d 342 (1943); Regal Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Merlis, 274 Fed. 915 (C. C. A.
2d 1921); Beebe v. G. H. Beebe Co., 64 N. J. L. 497, 46 Atl. 168 (Sup. CL 1900).
14. 2 FLrrcxrx, CooPoRArroNs § 618 (perm. ed. 1931.)
15. Hart Land & Improvement Co. v. Odd Fellows Hall Ass'n, 142 La. 487, 77 So. 125
(1917).
16. Blue Goose Mining Co. v. Northern Light Mining Co., 245 Fed. 727 (C. C. A. 9th
1917); Potter v. N. Y. Infant Asylum, 44 Hun 367 (N. Y. 1887); 9 FLL"cum, CoaponRszoN!S
§ 4216 (penn. ed. 1931); CLAax, ColwoRArsos § 716 (3d ed. 1923). But cf., Dent v.
People's Bank of Imboden, 118 Ark. 157, 175 S. W. 1154 (1915) where the court held
that the president of a bank had no authority to engage counsel on a general retainer.
17. Ashuelot Mfg. Co. v. Marsh, 1 Cush. 507 (Mass. 1844); Ney v. Eastern Iowa Telephone Co., 167 Iowa 525, 528, 144 N. W. 383, 386 (1913) where the court noted: "The
board of directors may, however, delegate to an agent the power to make contracts but the
agency must be created by the act of the corporation, through its board of directors, in.
order that the acts of the agent may be binding on the corporation.'
18. See notes 12 and 16- supra.
19. 274 Fed. 915 (C. C. A. 2d 1921).
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jury, or perhaps total failure of justice to the stockholders. Under the circumstances
we think the president, in the due performance of the duties of his office, should verify
"20 This action was not one in which the corporation was
and file an answer ....
plaintiff. It is submitted that there is greater justification for the permissive exercise
of authority by the president in defense of a suit than in instituting one on behalf of
the corporation. Time is of the essence in filing answers and a failure to file withir.
the time required by law may result in a default judgment being entered against the
corporation. It may well be impracticable for the president to call a meeting of the
board of directors and secure its approval to defend an action instituted against the
corporation within the allotted time. In the Regal case, moreover, the facts indicated that the dissenting directors had violated their fiduciary duty to the corporation
and that their action, in opposing the filing of an answer by the president, was motivated by self-serving interests. 2 '
In a more recent New Jersey case, also involving a divided board, Elbhitm 1olding
Corp. v. Mintz, 22 the president instituted suit on behalf of the corporation against
the treasurer of the corporation for rent due the corporation from lands leased to the
defendant. In upholding the president's action, the court declared: "If, as we have
seen, a president of a corporation may take the necessary steps in order to preserve
the corporate interests, so, in reason and justice, he may employ and authorize counsel
to institute necessary legal proceedings for the like purpose of preserving the interests
of his corporation."' 2 The court here made no distinction between the position of a
corporation when acting as plaintiff and as defendant. It did, however, recognize the
dearth of any legal precedents on which to sustain its holding and found for the plaintiff primarily on the grounds of "reason and justice." The president was held to have
authority to retain counsel and institute suit upon the basis of practical necessity and
expediency.
Tn neither of the above two cases did the president seek a resolution of the board
of directors approving his action in retaining counsel and instituting suit but instituted suit with knowledge that the board was evenly split. In this respect both
of these cases differ from the principal case where the president, before acting, sought
a motion of the board of directors and was met with an even division of the board.
Nevertheless, on agency principles, if we assume that an even division of the board of
directors constitutes a denial of authority, this difference does not seem to be important
that he is not authorized to do a particular act lacks
because an agent who knows
24
actual authority to do it.
The exact fact situation involved in the principal case presents an apparently new
20.

Id. at 917.

21. "Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra vires the corporation, except
where the directors are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they
stand in a dual relation which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment. . . .
United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261, 263 (1917).
22.

120 N. J. L. 604, 1 A. 2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1938).

Id. at 607, 1 A. 2d at 207. In Note, 48 YALE L. J. 1082 (1939) which discussed the
Elblum Holding Corp. case, it is noted that the court in that case disregarded basic agency
principles and decided the case on grounds of practical expediency and necessity. In the
principal case, however, the court refused to disregard the agency question since the president of a corporation is an agent of the corporation and his authority is governed by principles of agency.
24. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 36(b) (1934) reads: "Usage is not effective to contradict
the specific terms of an authorization or the known desires of the principal. ...
23.
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question to the courts of New York. The Appellate Division, relying on the decision
in the Elblum Holding Corp. case, declared that the president had authority to institute suit on behalf of the corporation for the purpose of preserving its corporate
interests. 2 5 In unanimously reversing the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals
stated that the decision of the Appellate Division "in effect amends section 27 to read
that the corporation shall be managed by its board of directors, except in the case of a
deadlock when it shall be managed by any director who happens to be president." °
The corporation's bylaws provided that "the act of a majority of the entire Board
of Directors shall consitute the act of the Board of Directors."27 This provision of
the bylaws was decisive of the case. The matter, having been submitted to the
board and a majority having failed to ratify the proposed act, there was an express
negation of authority. In the face of such a denial of authority, there could be no
question of prima facie or implied authority.m The situation presented in the principal case is analogous to the one that more frequently arises in the case of a partnership where the partners are evenly divided on a question.9 In the absence of an
25. 273 App. Div. 460, 466, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 691, 696 (1948).
26. 298 N. Y. 483, 492 (1949). See Comment, Corporations-Stockholders'Control by
Agreement, 17 FoiD. L. REV. 95 (1948).
27. This provision of the bylaws is in accord with N. Y. Gmz. CoRP. L.w § 27 which
provides: "... . and the act of a majority of the directors present at such a meeting shall
be the act of the board." After the decision in the case of Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel,
Inc., 294 N. Y. 112, 60 N. E. 2d 829 (1945), which held that a bylaw of a corporation
requiring the unanimous vote of stockholders for election of directors was unlawful because it contravened the legislative intent behind §§ 27 & 28 of the N. Y. Gs-r. Cor. LAw,
(b) that the
§ 9 was added to the N. Y. STOCK Cons. LAw. It provides in part: " ...
number of votes of directors that shall be necessary for the transaction of any business or
of any specified item of business at any meeting of directors shall be such number greater
than a majority as may be specified in such certificate. . .. " A provision in the bylaws
therefore, to the effect that any director who happens to be president may cast a deciding
vote when the board of directors is evenly divided would be of questionable validity.
For under the Stock and General Corporation Laws a majority vote of the board of directors is necessary to conduct corporate business.
28. It is important to note that the court did not have before it the question whether
the president of a corporation, in the absence of any indication by the board of directors
of its desires, possessed implied or prima fade authority to institute suit. There were
present no facts from which implied authority might be spelled out and the court was
careful to point out that "there is no question here of any presumptive or prima fade
authority in the president of a corporation qua president to institute litigation and engage
counsel therefor." 298 N. Y. 483, 490 (1949). The court did point out that the bylaws
contained no reference to any authority on the part of the president to institute litigation.
However, such an omission is not significant, because the express grant of such authority
would appear to be unusual. It would seem that the president of a corporation would have
prima facie authority (and, if he were in full charge of the corporate business, certainly incidental authority) to institute suit and retain counsel for such purpose. See notes 12, 13,
14, 16 supra.
29. If the facts of the principal case are viewed realistically, the corporation was in a
sense an 'incorporated partnership' between two groups of men. The court points out that
these groups were careful in preparing the bylaws in order that control might be shared
equally by both groups.
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agreement to the contrary, the decision of a majority controls, 0 and where half of
the partners decide against the bringing of a suit, such a suit is unauthorized. 2 '
Two qualifications of the court's decision must be noted. The court pointed out
that "no evidentiary facts are alleged to indicate that a crisis is at hand or that immediate

or vital injury

' 32
threatens plaintiff.

There is, accordingly,

at least an

intimation by the court that were such the case, the preservation of the very existence
of the corporation might give rise to a recognition of some extraordinary power in the
president in such a case, even if the board were divided, to do what would be necessary
to protect the corporation.33 How such a result might be squared with the basis for
the decision in the principal case, namely, that the president is a mere agent subject
to the control of the majority of the board, it would be difficult to explain. In such
a case, it might possibly be reasoned that the inherent right of self-preservation places
upon the president a duty to act which would not be affected by a mere deadlock
in the board. However, the necessity for implication of such an extraordinary power
and duty is to a great extent dissipated by the existence of the stockholder's derivative
right to sue on behalf of the corporation. In fact, the court in the principal case
suggests that the stockholder's derivative action is the appropriate remedy under the
facts of the principal case. 34 Secondly, had it appeared in the principal case that the
director who voted against the bringing of the suit violated their fiduciary duty of
loyalty to the corporation in doing so, their votes might have been disregarded. There
30. N. Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 40(8) (UNI'ORMz PARTNERSHIP LAW § 18(h)) provides:
"Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership business
may be decided by a majority of the partners; but no act in contravention of any agreement between the partners may be done rightfully without the consent of all the partners."
The' courts differ in the case where one partner, in a partnership composed of but two
partners, sues on behalf of the partnership to enforce an existing claim over the express
refusal and objection of the other partner. One group of cases holds that the action of
either partners is, for all practical purposes, the act of both. (Coggeshall v. McKenny, 114
S. C. 1, 103 S.E. 30 (1920); Hill v. Marsh, 46 Ind. 218 (1874); GILMORE, PARTNEaSnIIS
§ 125 (1911) (the author declares that one partner does not have authority to prevent a
co-partner from doing any act expressly or impliedly authorized by the articles of partnership. But the cases cited by the author all concern attempts by a partner to avoid a duty
already existing. In the principal case, the board acted before the president had engaged
an attorney or created any liability)). A contrary and more realistic view appears to be
that in the case of an even division of the partners, no action can be taken until the partners
themselves reach an agreement.

(CRANE,

PARTNERSiss § 53 (1938); Johnston & Co. v.

Dutton, 27 Ala. 245, 247 (1855)). Since partners are generally agents for each other, each
partner has apparent authority to bind the partnership as to any matter within the scope
of the partnership business and third parties, who do not know of a restriction on a partner's authority, may safely rely on such apparent authority. N. Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §
20 (UNIFORM PARTNERSMP § 9).

31. Johnston Co. v. Dutton, 27 Ala. 245, 247 (1855).
R.R., 136 Pa. 408, 20 At. 562 (1890).
32.

See Clarke v. Slate Valley

298 N. Y. 483, 492 (1949).

33. See Regal Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Merlis, note 20 supra and the accompanying
text.
34. "Plaintiff [sic] has an appropriate remedy by action in which it may obtain any
necessary provisional remedy as well as prompt trial, This is by a stockholders derivative
action. . . . If there be no cause of action, the plaintiff corporation will not have that
discovered in equity at its expense." 298 N. Y. 483, 493 (1949).
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were no facts in the principal case which would justify a finding of disloyalty, the
plaintiff merely claiming that the interest of the said directors in the corporate de-

fendant disqualified them from voting. In answer to this contention the court pointed
to a provision in the certificate of incorporation which expressly recognized that such
a conflicting interest might exist and in such event it was agreed that the interest of a
director in another corporation would not disqualify him. Nevertheless, the only
effect of such a provision is to remove the presumption of disqualification.as It does
not constitute an excuse for disloyalty or an approval thereof, and in a case of actual
disloyalty, it would seem that the vote of the disloyal directors may be disregarded.

CpmNAL LAW-HABEAS CORPUS-JURISDICTIoNAL ATTACK ON FIMST OFFENSE BY
FOURTH OFFENDER.--Relator, having been convicted four times of felonies, was
sentenced as a fourth offender as a consequence of the last of those convictions.
In 1946 he brought this habeas corpus proceeding alleging that at the date of the
commission of the first of these felonies in 1925 he was in fact not yet sixteen years
of age and, therefore, should not have been sentenced as a fourth offender. The
only evidence of his age to be found in the record of the first conviction was in
response to questioning prior to sentence pursuant to Section 485-a of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. At that time the relator when asked his age had responded
that he was twenty-one years old. The writ was sustained by the Special Term
justice and relator was ordered to be resentenced as a third offender. The Appellate
Division, reversing the order as a matter of law, dismissed the writ. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals, held, three judges dissenting, dismissal by Appellate Division
affirmed. People ex rel. Harrison v. Jackson, 298 N.Y. 219, 82 N.E. 2d 14 (1948).
A writ of habeas corpus is a process provided by law for deliverance from illegal
confinement.' In a swift and summary manner it may determine the right of the
warden or other custodian of a prison to hold a person as a prisoner in his custody.
Its use is confined to attacking the jurisdiction of the court which has sentenced
the person confined and not to reviewing questions of law or fact upon which the
decision of the sentencing court was based.2 If the court had jurisdiction of the
person of the relator and the subject matter of the action, the writ wil not lie even
though the court may have handed down an erroneous judgment on the evidencep
the proper remedy in such case being one of appeaL4
Relator in the principal case brought this habeas corpus proceeding contending
that because he was under sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of
35. Everett v. Philips, 288 N. Y. 227, 43 N. E. 2d 18 (1942); 11 FoRD. L. Riv. 311,
313 (1942).

1. People ex rel. Rosen v. Warden of City Prison, 234 App. Div. 349, 254 N. Y. Supp.
774 (1st Dep't 1932).
2. In People ex rel. Danziger v. Protestant Episcopal House of Mercy, 128 N. Y. 180,
185, 28 N.E. 473, 475 (1891), the court said that in a habeas corpus proceeding "the only
inquiry is whether the magistrate issuing process had authority to pronounce a judgment
of imprisonment for the cause assigned, and if this has been shown the statute forbids the
judge to review the decision of such magistrate."
3. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1231 states: "A person is not entitled to [habeas corpus] ...
(2) where he has been committed or is detained by virtue of the final judgment or decree
of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction.... "
4. People ex rel. Carr v. Martin, 286 N. Y. 27, 35 N. E. 2d 636 (1941).
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his first felony, the* county court sentencing him was without jurisdiction. Under
the Penal Law of New York0 a child under sixteen is capable only of committing
crimes which are punishable by death or life imprisonment. The criminal jurisdiction of the county court did not extend to sentencing a child under sixteen for
crimes other than those stated in the Penal Law, and the conviction of a child for
a lesser offense, as in the principal case, would appear to be a nullity.0
As the Children's Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine cases involving
children under the age of sixteen,r the age of the relator in the principal case was
one of the facts which determined whether or not the sentencing court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of action. The majority in the principal case held
that the writ did not lie for two reasons: first, because there was no evidence before
the court to justify the sustaining of the writ and second, because the age of the
relator was found as a fact by the trial court and such finding was not reviewable
by means of habeas corpus.8
As a general rule a lack of jurisdiction to render a judgment is always open to
attack by the use of habeas corpus. The one well-recognized exception to this rule
is where the jurisdictional question has already been litigated.0 It is readily admitted
by the minority in the principal case that where a court, on a disputed issue of fact,
has adjudicated a jurisdictional question such as age, its finding would have to stand
unless reversed on appeal. 10 In the principal case the question of age was not disputed
by relator or his counsel when he was first tried and convicted. In fact he admitted
being over sixteen during the examination held by the court prior to passing of
sentence." The majority opinion held that the sentencing court, pursuant to Section
2185 of the Penal Law, 12 made a finding of fact as to relator's age' 8 which may not
be collaterally attacked at a later date where there is no lack of the requirements
of due process. The minority, on the other hand, say that there was here no resemblance to a trial of an issue of fact. It would therefore seem that the conflict between
the two opinions might be resolved into the question: When has a court sufficiently
passed on a fact in order to preclude the use of habeas corpus? 14
5. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2186 states: "A child of more than seven and less than sixteen
years of age, who shall commit any act or omission which, if committed by an adult,
would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment, shall not be deemed guilty
of any crime, but of juvenile delinquency only ......
6. People v. Murch, 263 N. Y. 285, 290, 291, 189 N. E. 220, 221, 222 (1934).
7. N. Y. CniLDREN's CT. AcT § 61.
8. 298 N. Y. 219, 82 N. E. 2d 14 (1948).
9. People ex rel. Holt v. Lambert, 237 App. Div. 39, 260 N. Y. Supp. 678 (1st Dep't
1933), aff'd, 262 N. Y. 511, 188 N. E. 42 (1933).
10. 298 N. Y. 219, 231, 82 N. E. 2d 14, 20 (1948).
11. Id. at 220, 221, 82 N. E. 2d at 15, 16.

12. "A male between the ages of sixteen and thirty, convicted of a felony, who has not
theretofore been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, may...
be sentenced to imprisonment in the Elmira Reformatory. . . . " N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2185.
13. The relator in the principal case was asked his age pursuant to the questioning required by § 485-a of the N. Y. Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for an
examination of a convict before sentence is passed. 298 N. Y. 219, 220, 221, 82 N. E. 2d
14, 15, 16 (1948). See note 15 infra.
14. The concurring opinion in the principal case would have based the dismissal of the
writ on the ground that in New York the writ of habeas corpus may only be used to test
the legality of the detention according to the face of the record. 298 N. Y. 219t 225,
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The minority supports its conclusion by reasoning that there is no real trial of
an issue of fact where a person is questioned prior to passing of sentence by the
court. It is said that this line of questioning, authorized by Section 485-a of the
Code of Criminal Procedure,' 5 is utilized as a mere gathering of data for the information of the court in sentencing and for statistical purposes. People ex rel. Shepherd
v. Marti,1' 6 is cited by the minority as tending to support the proposition that a
finding based upon Section 485-a is not sufficient to preclude a person from challenging the same fact by means of habeas corpus. That case, however, is clearly distinguishable in that the court based its holding on the fact that the prisoner was not
indicted as a second offender, nor did the district attorney file an information accusing
the defendant of such prior conviction. This lack of proper indictment is not to be
found in the principal case.
It is submitted that the majority opinion in the principal case, although rigorous,
is sounder than that of the minority,17 and is also in accord with the more recent
Appellate Division decisions on this point.18 If it be kept in mind that the writ
82 N. E. 2d 14, 17 (1948). Although the New York decisions have not given rimc to a
definite rule on the subject, the cases do not appear to have limited the writ as severely
as the concurring opinion would suggest. In People ex rel. Carr v. Martin, 286 N. Y. 27,
32, 35 N. E. 2d 636, 638 (1941), the court said that there "can be no doubt that a person
detained under a judgment of a court, which never acquired jurisdiction of the cause which
it tried, is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, and at least in some cases he may sbow
such basic infirmity in the judgment by proofs extraneous to the proceedings before the
court which granted the judgment." See also cases cited in the minority opinion of the
principal case.
15. "Examination of convict before sentence. It shall be the duty of the court in
which any person shall be convicted of an offense punishable in a state prison, before
passing the sentence therefor, to ascertain by the examination of such convict on oath
. . .whether such convict had learned and practiced any mechanical trade, and in like
manner such other facts tending to indicate the causes of the criminal character or conduct
of such convict, as to the court shall seem proper and desirable, and the court .hall direct
the clerk of the court to enter such of the facts so ascertained ... upon the minutes of the
court. .

.

. " N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 495-a.

16. 267 App. Div. 1041, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 697 (4th Dep't 1944).
17. It should be noted that the cases cited by the minority opinion for the proposition
that relator may now collaterally attack his previous conviction for lack of jurisdiction may
be distingiushed from the principle case in that they are cases in which a prisoner was not
challenging a final judgment, People v. Cassels, 5 Hill. 164 (N.Y. 1843) ; People v. McLoed,
25 Wend. 483 (N. Y. 1841); People ex rel. Bungart v. Wells, 57 App. Div. 140, 6S N. Y.
Supp. 59 (2d Dep't 1901); or the court sentencing the prisoner was one of inferior jurisdiction, People ex rel. Danziger v. Protestant Episcopal House of Mercy, 128 N. Y. 180,
28 N. E. 473 (1891) ; People ex rel. Frey v. Warden, 100 N. Y. 20, 2 N. E. 870 (1885) ; or
the sentencing court did not make a finding as to the fact in question, People ex rel.
Albanese v. Hunt, 266 App. Div. 105, 41 N. Y. Supp. 646 (4th Dep't 1943), atl'd, 292 N. Y.
528, 54 N. E. 2d 379 (1944); Matter of Divine, 21 How. Pr. So (N. Y. 1860).
18. "The court had jurisdiction of both the person of the appellant and of the crime
with which he was charged. . . . The court made a finding that the appellant was over
the age of sxteen years ...when that sentence was imposed upon him. That judgment
of conviction cannot be attacked collaterally in this proceeding."' People ex rel. Wiegand
v. Brophy, 261 App. Div. 877, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 547, 548 (4th Dep't 1941). See also People
ex rel. Tully v. Fallon, 73 App. Div. 471, 77 N. Y. Supp. 292 (1st Dep't 1902).
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of habeas corpus may not be used to determine the sufficiency of evidence upon
which a finding is based, it would appear that a finding of a jurisdictional fact made
under the circumstances of the principal case should not be susceptible to later
attack by habeas corpus. 19
Where a jurisdictional requirement is involved there is a distinction between a
case where there is some evidence upon which the court may predicate its jurisdiction,
and a case where there is absolutely no such evidence.20 The Court of Appeals has
said that although a judge may have "reached a wrong conclusion upon the facts
presented, so that his order would be set aside on direct attack by motion to vacate,
still if he had some legal evidence to act upon, the order would be protected from
collateral attack after the entry of judgment ....
Proof requires that facts be stated
from which the conclusion sought may be logically drawn." 21 It would seem that
the questioning of the relator in the principal case as to his age meets the requirement
of "some legal evidence" and that it could logically be drawn from his admission
that he was over sixteen years of age that he was subject to the jurisdiction of the
court.
As the time to move, plead or appeal had apparently expired, 2" it may well be
that petitioner's only remaining remedy was by a plea for executive clemency. 2a
The minority in the principal case would appear to be swayed by the dissenting
opinion in People ex rel. Scharff v. Frost 24 where Judge Vann stated, in a case where
the petitioner was without legal remedy if habeas corpus was denied, that he was
"unwilling to take part in such a confession of weakness by the highest court in the
19. In People ex rel. Davis v. Jennings, 133 Misc. 538, 539, 540, 232 N. Y. Supp. 603,
605 (County Ct. 1929), under a similar situation as in the principal case, the lower court
on passing sentence had inquired as to relator's age and it was held that the "judgment
is conclusive as to every fact which the court was authorized to and did determine in rendering the judgment under which the prisoner is detained. . . . Where the jurisdiction depends upon certain facts, and the court has passed upon those facts, its determination is
conclusive until reversed or set aside. . . . " See Ex Parte Wallace, 75 Kan. 432, 89 Pac.
687 (1907).
20. Partenfelder v. People, 157 App. Div. 462, 471, 142 N.Y. Supp. 915, 923 (2d Dep't
1913), aff'd, 211 N. Y. 355, 105 N. E. 675 (1914).
21. Kennedy v. Lamb, 182 N. Y. 228, 233, 74 N. E. 834, 836 (1905) (italics supplied).
See State ex rel. Styles v. Bawerstad, 12 N.D. 527, 97 N.W. 548, 550 (1903), where the
court said that "the investigation of the evidence can only go to the extent of determining that there was some competent evidence before the magistrate tending to show the
commission of the offense named in the commitment, and upon which he could exercise
his judgment; because, if there was competent evidence of the commission of the offense,
then he had jurisdiction to make the finding, and, no matter how erroneous that finding may
be, it being within his power to make, it cannot be inquired into or revised in this proceeding."
22. 298 N. Y. 219, 224, 82 N. E. 2d 14, 16 (1948).
23. The concurring opinion suggests that the correct remedy for asserting the invalidity
of a prior conviction is by motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis In the
court where the petitioner was first convicted. 298 N. Y. 219, 228, 229, 82 N. E. 2d 14, 18,
19 (1948). That there is doubt, however, as to whether this remedy is available because
of the decision in Matter of Hogan v. Court of General Sessions, 296 N. Y. 1, 68 N. E. 2d
849 (1946), see the dissenting opinion in the principal case, 298 N.Y. 219, 229, 233, 82
N. E. 2d 14, 19, 22 (1948).
24. 198 N. Y. 110, 115, 91 N. E. 376, 378 (1910).
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state . ... The Court should not adjudge itself incompetent to deal with a simple
situation calling for relief from an illegal judicial act through the aid of the most
powerful and effective remedy known to statute or common law."' 2 Even in this
vigorous opinion, however, is to be found the limitation urged by the majority in
the principal case. Judge Vann states that the "presumption in favor of jurisdiction
being one of fact, may be rebutted, although when jurisdiction depends on the
existence of a certain fact and the court has found that fact, the fact stands until
26
reversed upon direct review."
A well-ordered system of jurisprudence must of necessity provide settled principles
and outlines to govern the use of the various proceedings and remedies which compose
it. If it were otherwise, confusion and inconsistencies would render the whole system
worthless. 27 There is no reason why the writ of habeas corpus should be an exception
to this rule. If at times the remedies provided appear to be inadequate to meet the
demands of a particular case the court should not distort a well-defined remedy in
order to meet the particular exigency. In such a case it would appear to be much
better for the court to admit its inadequacy and allow the legislature or the executive
department to remedy the situation.

CaRAL

LAw--LARCENY INDICTMENT-ALLEGATION

OF FALSE PRETENSES NoT

REQUIRED WVnERE FALSE PRETENSE SERVED ONLY TO PRODUCE PROPERTY STOLEN BY
SUBSEQUENT ACT OF TREsPAss.-Defendants were participants in a scheme to swindle
the X Company by fraudulently procuring checks drawn by the X Company to
fictitious payees and converting the proceeds thereof to themselves. One of the
defendants, Nickel, an employee of the company, pleaded guilty to a charge of grand
larceny and turned state's evidence to disclose details of an elaborate plan whereby
he prepared and submitted to authorized officers of the company for signature, some
seventy-six checks in amounts totaling more than $400,000, drawn to fictitious payeecreditors whose names were chosen by him to simulate the names of bona fide
creditors then doing business with the company. The defendant Lobel provided
Nickel with specially prepared false invoices bearing the names of fictitious creditors,
and also undertook to cash the checks which Nickel acquired by such means. On
appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division affirming a conviction of grand
larceny in the first degree, held, three judges dissenting (one in part only), conviction
affirmed on the ground that the false invoices merely produced the checks which
were subsequently stolen by the larcenous trespass of Nickel in pocketing them, hence
no allegation of false pretenses was required in the indictment under Section 1290-a
of the Penal Law. People U. Lobel, 298 N.Y. 243, 82 N.E. 2d 145 (1948).
This is the first case in which the Court of Appeals has been called upon to
interpret the 1942 revision of the New York statutory crime of larceny.' The declared
25.
26.
27.
E. 2d

Id. at 118, 91 N. E. at 379.
Id. at 116, 91 N. E. at 378.
See Matter of Morhous v. Supreme Court of New York, 293 N. Y. 131, 140, 56 N.
79, 84 (1944).

1. A lower court decision, People v. Lehrer, 182 Misc. 645, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 170 (1943),
involved the case of a married man charged with obtaining money from a woman by
false pretenses in consideration of his promise of marriage. It was held that representations
by a married man that he was single constituted sufficient false pretene to sustain the
charge.
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intention of the Legislature was to rid larceny prosecutions of the confusion and
"nice" distinctions between common law larceny by trespass, or by trick, false pretenses and embezzlement. 2 There can be no doubt about the legislative intent, as
the amendatory act was prefaced by a declaration of public policy stating: "It is
the public policy of the state that the best interest of the people of the state Will
be served, and confusion and injustice avoided, by eliminating and abolishing the
3
distinctions which have hitherto differentiated one sort of theft from another."
It appears that the wording of the amended statute still leaves much to be desired
if the confusion of the past is to be eliminated. 4 In the revised Section 1290 the
Legislature declared: "Hereafter it shall be immaterial in, and no defense to, a
prosecution for larceny that: 1. The accused obtained possession of, or title to,
such property with the consent of the person from whom he obtained it, provided
he induced such consent by a false or fraudulent representation, pretense, token,
or writing; or . . . 4 The person from whom the accused obtained such property
intended to part with title to, as well as possession of, such property, or with
possession as well as title. ... "5
Although the dual reference in subdivision 3 to "title as well as possession . . .
or possession as well as title" seems somewhat ambiguous and superfluous, nevertheless the general intent of the Legislature to render such distinctions immaterial is
quite evident. But then, by the addition of Section 1290-a, the lawmakers proceeded
to re-introduce a stumbling block which the Court of Appeals in the present case
has only surmounted by pursuing a circuitous route leading to an apparent negation
of the good intentions expressed by the Legislature. Section 1290-a, regulating the
manner of pleading and proof, specifies: "If, however, the theft was effected by
means of any false or fraudulent representation or pretense, evidence thereof may
not be received at the trial unless the indictment or information alleges such means...
but as long as one of the false or fraudulent representations or pretenses alleged be
proven, any other related representation or pretense, though not alleged, may be
given in evidence." 0
2. Prior to 1942, larceny in New York was of three types: A. Common Law Larceny,
which included (1) larceny by trespass (i.e., unlawful taking and asportation), Hildebrand
v. People, 56 N. Y. 394 (1874); Harrison v. People, 50 N. Y. 518 (1872); and (2) larceny
by trick and device (i.e., possession obtained by such means), People v. Miller, 169 N. Y.
339, 62 N. E. 418 (1902) ; Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y. 322 (1876) ; Smith v. People, 53 N. Y.
111 (1873) ; B. False Pretenses (title obtained in reliance upon misrepresentation as to past
or existing fact), People v. Stiller, 255 App. Div. 480, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 865 (1938), aft'd, 280
N. Y. 518, 19 N. E. 2d 923 (1939); People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927);
C. Embezzlement (conversion by person rightfully in possession), People v. Epstein, 245
N. Y. 234, 157 N. E. 121 (1927); People v. Meadows, 199 N. Y. 1, 92 N. E. 128 (1910);
People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend. 148 (N. Y. 1836).
3. See Fuld (who as a member of the Court wrote one of the dissenting opinions in
the principal case) The New Larceny Law, 107 N. Y. L. J. 2124 (May 19, 1942); Note,
Criminal Law-A New Definition of Larceny, 11 FORD. L. REy. 323 (1942).
4. See Notes, Larceny-Embezzlement-ObtainingProperty by False Pretenses, 22 MINN.
L. REv. 211 (1938) ; Larceny, Embezzlement and Obtaining Property by False Pretenses, 20
COL. L. Rav. 318 (1920). Beale, The Borderland of Larceny, 6 HAv. L. R.v. 244 (1892).
5. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1290.
6. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1290-a. This requirement of special pleading in the indictment Is
a codification of the common law. People v. Peckens, 153 N.Y. 576, 588, 47 N.E. 883
886 (1897). See note 24 infra. Previous attempts by the Legislature to clarify the law of
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The difficulty which the court encountered in upholding the larceny convictions in
this case was simply that the indictment on which the defendants were tried did not
contain any allegation of false representation or pretense, as required by Section
1290-a, yet evidence of false representations was received at the trial. 7 The majority
of the court, however, overcame this difficulty by finding that the false pretenses,
evidenced by the fraudulent invoices which the defendant Lobel prepared, did not
produce the larcenies but merely produced the checks payable to fictitious payees,
and that the larcenies were accomplished subsequently at the moment when Nickel,
who was in possession of the wrongfully produced checks, exceeded his authority
and pocketed the checks with intent to steal. Hence, despite the fact that prior to
the actual theft false representations were made which produced the property stolen,
it is reasoned by the majority that the subsequent theft was accomplished without
reference to such representations. The court further held that title to the checks
did not pass from the X Company by the larcenous acts of Nickel since the payees
were fictitious and were not known to the company.8
The history of prosecutions for theft, both in this country and in England, has
been steeped in procedural difficulties caused by fine technical distinctions which
heretofore differentiated common law larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining property
by false pretenses. 9 In many cases the question of whether a crime was larceny or
embezzlement was determined by the nebulous distinction between custody and
possession,' 0 or upon the precise instant of time at which the intent to steal was
formed,11 or upon the issue of "breaking the bulk". 2 In other cases the crime of
larceny were made in New York in 1881 (N.Y. Laws 1881, c. 676), but failed to achieve
the legislative purpose because the courts refused to interpret the statutes as affecting
any procedural reform.
7. See Note, Streamlining the Indictment, 53 HAzy. L. REv. 122 (1939).
8. NEGOTIABLE INsmuMENTs LAW § 28(3) (UN-oRm NEGorALE L'nsmuamraEzs LAW
§ 9(3)) provides that the instrument is payable to bearer "when it is payable to the order
of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so
"In applying this statute to the facts of the principal casse the court, citing
payable ....
City of New York v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N. Y. 64, 184 N. E. 495 (1933), apparently reasoned that as the fictitious character of the payees was unknown to the signatory officers of the Company, the checks were not payable to bearer and hence when
they were delivered to Nickel, possession merely and not title passed. As shown by People
v. Miller, 169 N. Y. 339, 62 N. E. 418 (1902), Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y. 322 (1876),
Smith v. People, 53 N. Y. 111 (1873), and as well as People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576, 47
N. E. 883 (1897), People v. Blanchard, 90 N. Y. 314 (1892), and Rex v. Pear, 1 Leach
212, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (1799), the prior case law is well established that where the
owner has voluntarily and completely passed title there can be no common law larceny
by trick and device, though the owner was induced to part with title by fraud.
9. Rex v. Pear, supra note 8, was the first case to recognize the crime of larceny by
trick.
10. In re Grin, 112 Fed. 790 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1901), affd, 187 U. S. 181 (1902); People
v. Burr, 41 How. Pr. 293 (N. Y. 1871); People v. McDonald, 43 N. Y. 61 (1870); Regina v.
Reed, 6 Cox C. C. 284 (1854); Rex v. Bazeley, 2 Leach 835, 163 Eng. Rep. 517 (1799).
11. As in the case of a finder of lost property, see Regina v. Thurborn, 1 Den. 387,
169 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849).
12. See Nichols v. People, 17 N. Y. 114 (1858); Carrier's Case, Y. B. 13 EDw. IV, 69,
pl. 5 (1473).
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larceny by trick 13 was differentiated from larceny by false pretenses 14 on the technicality that the latter crime required a particular kind of misrepresentation, i.e.,
misrepresentation with reference to a past or existing fact."i
Prior to the 1942 amendment of the Penal Law there were in general two procedural restrictions on prosecutions for larceny established by the courts. The first,
and more grievous restriction, was that each form of larceny had to be prosecuted

by a separate indictment, or by a separate count of the same indictment.' 0 The

second restriction was the established rule that in prosecutions for larceny by false
pretenses evidence of false pretenses or fraudulent representations could only be
17
admitted if the allegations of the indictment specifically charged such false pretenses,
but that upon allegation and proof of any one fraudulent representation evidence of
additional false pretenses, other than those alleged, could be admitted, provided such
8
additional pretenses or representations were related to the transaction charged.'
These procedural technicalities, coupled with the subtle distinctions drawn between
the several forms of larceny, frequently enabled a thief to escape punishment because
of the prosecutor's failure to charge the precise form of larceny which the subsequent
development of evidence established, or because the trial judge failed to perceive the
9
On numerous occasions the courts
exact type of theft that had been established.'
were forced to engage in circumlocution for the purpose of suiting the facts presented
20
to the particular form of larceny charged by the indictment.
13. People v. Stiller, 255 App. Div. 480, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 865 (1938), aff'd, 280 N. Y. 518,
19 N. E. 2d 923 (1939) ; People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576, 588, 47 N. E. 883, 886 (1897) ;
People v. Blanchard, 90 N. Y. 314 (1882); Rex v. Pear, 1 Leach 212, 168 Eng. Rep. 208
(1799).

14. People v. Sloane, 254 App. Div. 780, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 784 (1938), aff'd, 279 N. Y. 724,
17 N. E. 2d 141 (1939); People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927); People
v. Miller, 169 N. Y. 339, 62 N. E. 418 (1902).
15. The difficulties of this requirement are illustrated in Brennan v. State, 141 Neb.
205, 3 N. W. 2d 217 (1942).
16. People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 13 N. E. 325 (1887).
17. People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576, 47 N. E. 883 (1897). In prosecutions for larceny
by trick the false pretenses or representations constituting the trick did not have to be
alleged.
18. People v. Colmey, 117 App. Div. 462, 102 N. Y. Supp. 714 (1907), aff'd, 188 N. Y.
573, 80 N. E. 1115 (1907); People v. Sattlekau, 120 App. Div. 42, 104 N. Y. Supp. 805
(1907); People v. Rothstein, 180 N. Y. 148, 154, 72 N. E. 999, 1001 (1904).
19. People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927). Under an indictment for
larceny by trick, where the complaining witness, on defendant's representation that he
would sublet an apartment to complainant, paid defendant $550 cash as advance rent, but
never received possession of the apartment because the defendant had no lease as represented,
it was held that the defendant was not guilty, since the complainant parted with title
as well as possession of his money. See also, People v. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502, 13 N. E. 325
(1887); Zink v. People, 77 N. Y. 114 (1879).
20. People v. Stiller, 255 App. Div. 480, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 865 (1938), aft'd, 280 N. Y. 518,
19 N. E. 2d 923 (1939). This was a case of a cash transaction similar to People v. Noblett,
supra note 19, but here the court reasoned to an opposite conclusion, i.e., complainant in
paying $200 cash for gold mine stock which he never received was held to have intended
to part merely with possession, but not with title to his money. Hence the conviction of
larceny by trick was upheld without an allegation of false pretenses; see also People
v. Miller, 169 N. Y. 339, 62 N. E. 418 (1902); Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y. 322 (1876).
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By the amendment of 1942 the Legislature clearly indicated its determination to
eliminate the more grievous restriction by merging the several old forms of larceny,
which had grown up with perplexing refinements and distinctions through the years,
into a single unified crime. 2 ' To this end Section 1290 of the Penal Law was completely rewritten, explicitly rendering immaterial the concepts of possession and title
in prosecutions for larceny.
But rather than eliminate the second restriction, with respect to pleading of false
pretenses, the Legislature apparently desired to codify the former rulena by the
enactment of Section 1290-a.P The present decision suggests that the legislative
draftsmen might better have gone all the way in their design to streamline the law
of larceny by taking steps also to eliminate the special pleading requirements instead
of codifying them into Section 1290-a,24 for by the court's reasoning, in order to
cope with the requirements of this section, the spectres of possession and title which
previously hindered the effective administration of justice are hereby revived.
Perhaps the Legislature had in mind the guarantee of individual justice to all
defendants by affording adequate notice through the pleading of special circumstances
upon which the prosecution may attempt to prove false pretenses or fraudulent
representations. Such intention appears to be the only reasonable explanation for
passage of Section 1290-a. Whether in most criminal cases such pleadings are practically necessary to protect defendants from surprise may be debatable, but in the
principal case it could not be reasonably argued that the defendants were without
constructive notice, at least, that they might be confronted by evidence of false
invoices, in view of the earlier trial court record. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
reconcile this decision with any literal interpretation of the statute. Here the admission of evidence respecting fraudulent representations without allegation of such
representations in the indictment was, by the minority view, in disregard of a controlling statute. Yet had the court rendered a contrary decision we might have seen
21. For a discussion of other modem statutes see HALL & GLuEcr, CAsEs o Cneam-AL
LAw 226-28 (1940)
22. See note 17 supra.
23. Whether § 1290-a accurately codifies the old rule or inadvertently went beyond a
mere codification may be questioned. See Note, 11 FoRD. L. REv. 323, 327 (1942). The
wording of § 1290-a seems to impose a burden not required at common law on the prosecution if, where the trick or device by which common law larceny is committed takes the
form of a misrepresentation. In such a case the statute, literally interpreted, requires that
such trick be alleged in the indictment. See note 16 sipra.
24. Perhaps the old label of "larceny" should also be eliminated and the redefined
unified crime be identified simply as "theft." (See Note, 11 Foan. L. REV. 323, 324 n. 9
(1942). The statute (N. Y. Pmr-,AL LAW § 1290) does use the general and popularly used
verb "stole.") The Massachusetts statute enacted in 1899 approaches this simplification,
c. 277, § 39: "The following words, when used in an indictment, shall be sufficient to
convey the meaning herein attached to them. . . . Stealing. Larceny. The criminal taking,
obtaining or converting of personal property, with intent to defraud or deprive the
owner permanently of the use of it!' The Massachusetts General Laws 1931, c. 266, § 30
provide: "Whoever steals, or with intent to defraud, obtains by a false pretense, or whoever unlawfully and, with intent to steal or embezzle, converts or secretes, with intent
to convert, the money or personal chattel of another, whether such money or personal
chattel is or is not in his possession at the time of such conversion or secreting, shall be
.
guilty of larceny ....
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another case like People v. Noblettss where the uncertainties inherent in the subtle
distinctions between complete passage of title and voluntary surrender of possession
of negotiable bank notes enabled a proven wrongdoer to escape punishment.
The court does not state definitely what form of larceny was committed by Nickel
but it would seem by a process of elimination to have been larceny by trespass. If
the defendant had been on trial for the common law crime of larceny by trick, as
recognized prior to 1942, evidence of false pretenses constituting the trick by which
possession was obtained would have been admissible without any specific allegation
of such pretenses, 26 but by the court's own reasoning in this case the false pretenses
did not effect the crime but merely produced the checks which were subsequently
stolen. Hence this interpretation of the facts would not spell out the crime of larceny
by trick even by pre-1942 standards.
There appears to be ground for the genuine concern expressed by Judge Fuld in
his dissenting opinion that this decision, while disregarding the technicalities of
pleading which the Legislature has not seen fit to eliminate, may serve "to resurrect
the ancient confusion" 27 which the Legislature sought to abolish by the 1942 enactments. The majority of the court undoubtedly intended to get away from the ancient
distinctions by making the decision they did. However, a reconciliation of their
holding with the plain procedural requirement of the statute necessarily, it seems,
involves one in just such a type of distinction.

TAXATION -

CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS -

TAXABLE INCOME OR GIFT. -

Respondent purchased at less than face value secured bonds which evidenced his
personal indebtedness and which had been issued by him at face value for cash.
Each creditor knew that the bonds were being bought by the debtor or for him
through a bondholders' committee or security dealers. The debtor was at all times
solvent but in straightened financial circumstances. Held, two Justices dissenting,
the respondent, in purchasing the bonds, realized taxable gain and was not merely
the recipient of an exempt gift. Commissioner v. Jacobson, 69 Sup. Ct. 358 (1949). 1
The tax consequences of cancellation of indebtedness by the purchase of obligations
have been uncertain since the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co. 2 that such transactions resulted in taxable income. Prior to that case
it had been thought that taxable income did not result from such dealings. 3 In the
25. See note 19 supra.
26. People v. Lawrence, 137 N. Y. 517, 33 N. E. 547 (1893). See note 24 supra.
27. 298 N. Y. 243, 260, 82 N. E. 2d 145, 154 (1948).
1. Mr. Justice Rutledge, although joining in the Court's judgment and opinion was
of the view that the result was essentially in conflict with that reached in Helvering v.
American Dental Co., 318 U. S. 322 (1943).
2.

284 U. S. 1 (1931).

3. Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U. S. 170 (1926). Although the KerbaughEmpire case was not overruled by the Kirby case, it was distinguished. In the Kirby case
the taxpayer suffered no shrinkage of assets but realized a clear gain, the Kerbaugh-Empire
decision was restricted to the situation where the whole transaction-the original loan
and the subsequent purchase of the evidence of the loan at less than face value--had
resulted in a loss. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359 (1931) was also thought
to have 'had a detrimental effect on the Kerbaugh-Empire decision but it too was merely
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Kirby case a corporate taxpayer having issued bonds for cash equal to their face
value purchased and retired some of them in the open market at a price less than
their face value. It was held that assets previously offset by outstanding bonds had
been released and to that extent taxable income was realized.4 This decision gave
rise to the "net assets" theory which requires a tax upon the amount of gain or
income realized by the increase in assets over liabilities. Accordingly, it was held
that where an insolvent debtor had his debt cancelled and remained insolvent after
such cancellation no taxable income arose.0 But where the transaction caused the
insolvent debtor to become solvent, it was held that he had realized taxable income
as to the resulting excess of assets over liabilities.0
The debtor who was close to insolvency was hard pressed by these decisions. He
could not make any agreement with his creditors to purchase his obligations for less
than their value without facing the income tax collector 1 This result might
place the debtor in practical insolvency without the opportunity to enjoy the tax
benefits of technical insolvency. While the motives for this "solvency" distinction
were perhaps equitable, 8 the ultimate result was not. This may have been one of
the considerations for the inclusion in the Chandler Act of an exemption to certain
corporations for income realized through a cancellation of indebtedness.0 Then the
amendments of 1939 to the Internal Revenue Code 10 extended the exemptions of
a restriction. Lynch, Sonte Tax Effects of Cancellation of Indebtedness, 13 Foen. L. REV.
145, 151 (1944).
4. The rule of the Kirby case was extended by Helvering v. American Chicle Co, 291
U. S. 426 (1934), to apply to an assumption of another's obligation whether that obligation
-was acquired for property or money.
5. Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commisoner, 70 F. 2d 95 (C. C. A.
5th 1934) compared the transaction to a bankruptcy situation.
6. Lakeland Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 289 (1937). For a more complete discussion of this point see Warren and Sugarman, Cancellation of Indebtedness and
Its Tax Consequences, 40 CoL. L. R-v. 1326, 1351 (1940).
7. Some transactions did escape the Kirby rule however. A contribution to capital
rather than income was worked out through the bookkeeping systems employed when
a stockholder gratuitously forgave the corporation's debt to himself. Commissioner v. Auto
Strop Safety Razor Co., 74 F. 2d 226 (C. C. A. 2d 1934). This system, though not the
theory, was later checked in Helvering v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F. 2d 933 (C. C. A. 8th
1940), cert. denied sub nom., Helvering v. Mallinckrodt, 311 U. S. 672 (1940). Where the
-value of property dropped below the amount of the obligation which was incurred by its
purchase, payment of less than the full obligation in exchange for its complete cancellation was held to be a readjustment of purchase price rather than income. Hirsch v. Com:missioner, 115 F. 2d 656 (C. C. A. 7th 1940); Helvering v. A. L. Killian Co., 128 F. 2d
433 (C. C. A. 8th 1942). Nor was mere diminution of loss income. Transylvania Ry. v.
Commissioner, 99 F. 2d 69 (C. C. A. 4th 1938). The question was considered from the
standpoint of a gain on the final disposition of property not as income from the cancellation
.of indebtedness in Lutz v. Schramm Co., 1 T. C. 682 (1943). Where bonds were exchanged
for stock there was no realization of income. Capento Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,
47 B. T. A. 691 (1942).
8. See Warren and Sugarman, supra note 5; Darrell, Discharge of Indebtedness and The
.FederalIncome Tax, 53 HARv. L. Rav. 977, 988 (1940).
9. Corporations reorganizing under Chapter X were allowed this exemption. 52 STAr.
904 (1938), as amended, 54 STAT. 709 (1940), 11 U. S. C. §§ 668-70 (1940).
10. R v. AcT. or 1939 § 215(a).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 18

the Chandler Act to any corporation in an unsound financial condition. Thus, when
a corporation realized income from the cancellation of indebtedness it was allowed
a temporary exemption if it complied with the requisites of the Code. In 1942, the
Code was further expanded to embrace cancellations of indebtedness of any corporation, regardless of its financial condition."
12
However,
The limited relief offered by these amendments was far from adequate.
3
appeared
Co.1
Dental
v.
American
Helvering
in
Court
Supreme
of
the
the decision
to offer a more satisfactory solution. There the taxpayer corporation was burdened
by a past due debt on an open account for rent and interest. The creditor, dealing
directly with the debtor, agreed to accept part payment and cancel the balance. The
for nothing and sufficient
forgiveness was held to be gratuitous, a release of something
14
to make the cancellation a gift within Section 22(b)(3).
The period following the American Dental decision is marked by attempts of the
lower courts to determine a workable basis for distinguishing those transactions to
which the Kirby rule should apply from those governed by the American Dental
principle. That uncertainty existed is evident from decisions presenting two distinct
views.
The personal or impersonal (the Court in the instant case used the terms "face
to face" as opposed to "open market") nature of the transaction was held to be the
15
determining factor in Bulkeley Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner. There a taxpayer sent
letters to its debenture holders, inviting them to offer their debentures for sale to
the taxpayer for a flat price. As a result, the debentures were surrendered for less
than their face value. The effect was held to be a receipt of something for nothing
making the cancellation a gift within the American Dental decision. As to other bond
purchases made by the taxpayer in the open market, the personal element necessary
to comply with the American Dental case was not present and therefore it was held
that taxable income resulted. 1' A second view, however, made consideration the
11. INT. REV. CODE § 22(b)(9) (1942). "Income from Discharge of Indebtedness. In
the case of a corporation, the amount of any income of the taxpayer attributable to the discharge, within the taxable year, of any indebtedness of the taxpayer or for which the
taxpayer is liable evidenced by a security [may be excluded from gross income] . . . If
the taxpayer makes and files at the time of filing the return, in such manner as the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, by regulations prescribes, its consent to the
regulations prescribed under section 113(b) (3) then in effect. In such case the amount of
any income of the taxpayer attributable to any unamortized premium . . . with respect to
such indebtedness shall not be included in gross income and the amount of the deduction
attributable to any unamortized discount . . . with respect to such indebtedness shall not be
allowed as a deduction. As used in this paragraph the term 'security' means any bond,
debenture, note, or certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by any corporation,
This paragraph shall not apply to any discharge occurring before the date of enactment
of the Revenue Act of 1939, or in a taxable year beginning after December 31, 1941." This
section has been amended periodically since 1942 extending its effective dates.
12. The amendments afforded relief only to corporations and only if the transactions
came within specific dates. See note 11 supra.
13. 318 U. S. 322 (1943), 12 FORD. L. REV. 198.
14. INT. REv. CODE § 22(b) (3) provides for the exemption from taxation of the value
of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance.
15. T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 109,679 (1944).
16. Open market transactions leave no room for the gift theory of the American Dental
case. Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F. 2d 453 (C. C. A. 2d
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controlling norm. Since the American Dental case lessened the importance of donative
intent and looked rather for an absence of consideration to work out a gift, 17 the
presence of consideration was thought to preclude the application of the American
Dental doctrine. Reliable Incubator & Brooder Co.' 8 adopted this position. The
taxpayer was obligated to make payments of $50 a month on a princip3l debt of
$6700. The creditor reduced the principal debt by $1200 in return for an immediate
$600 payment. This payment of an obligation before its due date constituted consideration for the forgiveness of part of the debt. The American Dental case wras
distinguished on this ground and taxable income was held to result. 0 Conversely a
transaction in which no consideration was found militated against the possibility of
taxable income being realized and gave rise to a gift.sO
1945); Central Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 158 F. 2d 131 (C.C. A. 6th 1946). A distinction similar to that drawn in the Bulkeley case was made in Commissioner v. Jacobson, 6
T. C. 1048 (1946) and in Edmont Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, 10 T. C. 260 (1948).
17. In the American Dental case the Tax Court, which the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court reversed, had found that donative intent could not be present since there was no
evidence of it; on the contrary business motives prompted the creditor to the cancellation.
The Circuit Court countered: "As long as there was no consideration for the cancellation
the intent to give necessarily followed!' 128 F. 2d 254, 256 (C. C. A. 2d 1942). And the
Supreme Court said: "The fact that motives leading to the cancellations were those ol business or even selfish . . .is not significant. The forgiveness was gratuitous, a release of
" 318 U. S. 322, 331 (1942). At least one taxsomething to the debtor for nothing ....
payer attempted to take advantage of the American Dental case where he could show
no donative intent. The statute of limitations had run on his debt and therefore he claimed
he was the donee of a gift from his creditor since the debt was in effect released for
nothing. The court distinguished the situation from the American Dental case pointing out
that the creditors' action in the latter was affirmative. The Securities Co. v. United States,
5 CCH 1948 FED. TA RE-'. g 9239 (1948). See also Schweppe v. Commissoner, 8 T. C.
1224 (1947); Lynch, Some Tax Effects of Cancellation of Indebtedness, 13 FoRD. L. REV.
145, 162 (1944).
18. 6 T. C. 919 (1946). See also, Walsh Holyoke Steam Boiler Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 160 F. 2d 185 (C. C. A. 1st 1947); The McKay Products Corp. v. Commisoner, 9
T. C. 1082 (1947). Contra: Shellabarger Grain Products Co. v. Commisioner, 146 F. 2d
177, 185 (1944) (where the due date of certain notes had been extended and the creditor
agreed in consideration of immediate payment to accept less than the full amount; it was
held that no income was realized).
19. Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 166 F. 2d 647 (C. C. A. 9th 1948) made the same distinction.
20. Liberty Mirror Works v. Commissioner, 3 T. C. 1018 (1944). Here the Tax Court
found that acceptance of cash plus a new note, the sum of which was about one-third of
the original past due debt, and the forgiveness of the original debt in exchange therefor
in direct dealings between debtor and creditor amounted to payment of part of the debt,
extension of part and forgiveness of part since the creditor received nothing to which it
was not entitled. In A. M. Campau Realty Co. v. U. S., 69 F. Supp. 133 (CL CL 1947),
a corporate taxpayer purchased directly from its bondholders matured bonds for sixty
cents on the dollar. This was thought to be a transaction without consideration resulting
in a gift. But the transfers were not alleged to have been gratuitous so that the debtor was
not allowed to rely on this position. Cf., Terminal Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T. C.
1004 (1943) where no income was found because there was no increase in net assets; the
debt was contingent and therefore the cancellation of it resulted in no gain on theory of
the American Dental case.
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It should be noted that in these "consideration" cases, the transfers were the result
of "face to face" transactions, yet this apparently was considered secondary to the
test adopted. The difficulty in determining the distinguishing feature between the
Kirby and Avmrican Dental cases has been pointed up in the progress of the principal
case through the lower courts. The Tax Court 2 ' held that no income resulted from
the purchases of bonds by the petitioner directly from the creditors, but as to those
transactions conducted by the bondholders' committee and security dealers, taxable
gain was realized. Only one judge dissented,2 2 holding that the presence of consideration (arising because the purchases were made before maturity) made all the
purchases taxable irrespective of the personal or impersonal nature of the transaction.
The Court of Appeals held all the transactions to be gifts since all the bond
sellers knew the bonds were being bought by or for the debtor and, therefore, none
of the sales were akin to open market transactions as contemplated by the Kirby case.
The creditors "parted with their security at less than its face value with knowledge
that the amount received was in discharge of the debtor's obligation."' 3 In reversing
the Court of Appeals the Supreme Court stated that there was no basis for its finding
of a gift in respect to any of the bonds without a finding of intent by the sellers
to transfer something for nothing, as distinguished from an intent to get the highest
possible amount for their entire claims. The Court laid stress upon the intent of
Congress in amending Section 22(b) of the Internal Revenue Code 2 4 by the addition
to corpoof Section 22(b)(9), pointing out that the exemptions were allowed only
2
rations and then only if they complied with the provisions of the Code. 5 The exclusion of individuals from the exemption emphasized, in the opinion of the Court, the
taxability of their gains.26
The circumstance that the ultimate parties were known to each other was thought
subordinate to the fact that the seller sought to get as high a price and the buyer
as low a price as they could. That consideration may have been received was also
held to be nondeterminative. 27 The Court stated the ground for its decision in the
following manner: "The situation in each transaction is a factual one. It turns upon
whether the transaction is in fact a transfer of something for the best price available
or is a transfer or release of only a part of a claim for cash and of the balance for
28
nothing."
21. 6 T. C. 1048 (1946).
22. Kern, J., took a position similar to that which he had taken in the Reliable Incubator
case, supra note 18, where the presence of consideration was thought to preclude a gift.
6 T.C. 1048, 1058 (1946).
23. 164 F. 2d 594, 598 (C. C. A. 7th 1947).
24. The decision shows that if elimination of indebtedness were already embraced by
§ 22(b)(3), there would have been no need for § 22(b)(9).
25. The exclusion under § 22(b)(9) is available only if the taxpayer consents to a reduction in basis as prescribed in § 113(b)(3).
26. 69 Sup. Ct. 358, 368 (1949).
27. Ibid. "... we do not rest this case upon the Tact that the sale was made before maturity or that the seller may have received valid consideration for a total release of his claim
because the debtor's payment was made before maturity." 69 Sup. Ct. 358, 370 (1949).
The Court went on to say that there could be both consideration and donative intent in
one transaction but it would be more likely to occur in connection with a release of an
open account for rent (citing Kelvering v. American Dental Co.) than in the sale of outstanding securities.
28. 69 Sup. Ct. 358, 370 (1949). It should be noted however that the Court admitted,
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The practical effect of the decision appears to be the elimination of the "face to
face" element as of any controlling importance in determining whether or not there
was a gift. The relationship of the parties undoubtedly still retains its pertinency as
evidentiary features of this type of case, the decision does not appear to represent
or absence of donative intent.29 Aside from announcing a shift of emphasis on the
evidentiary features of this type of case, the decision does not appear to represent
any substantial departure from the decision in the American Dental case.

TAXATIoN-FEDERAL EsTATE TAX-TRANSFERS INTENDED To TAKE EFFECT
SESSION OR ENJOYMENT AT OR AFTER DEATH.-Decedent made a transfer in

IN Pos-

trust in

1920 of certain stocks to himself and another as trustees. During his life the trust
income was to be divided equally among his three children for their maintenance,
support, and education. If any of the children died the income applicable to such
child would go to the children of such child, and if there were no children of such
child then to the surviving children of the settlor and their descendants, per stirpes.
Upon the death of the settlor the corpus of the trust was to be divided equally among
his children or per stirpes to their descendants. The trust had a spendthrift clause
which made the interests under the trust unassignable. No provision was made for
disposing of the corpus of the trust in the event that the settlor outlived all his descendants. Decedent died in 1940 and was survived by his three children. In the
estate tax return filed by the executor no part of the corpus of this trust was included
in the gross estate of the decedent. In recomputing the estate tax the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue included the fair market value of the entire trust estate plus
the accumulated income as of the valuation date. The Tax Court sustained the
executor but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed, sustaining the Commissioner.
On appeal, held, three justices dissenting, affirmed. Spiegel's Estate v. Commssioner,
335 U. S. 701 (1949).
A provision concerning transfers "intending to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death" has been a part of the Federal Estate Tax Law since that
particular tax became a permanent part of the federal revenue system.1 This proat p. 363, the bonds apparently were collectible in full through appropriate enforcement
proceedings. Mlight not this lack of enforcement have been some evidence of donative
intent?
29. "In the absence of proof to the contrary, the intent of the seller may be assumed to
have been to get all he could for his entire claim.... There is nothing in the evidence or
findings to indicate that he intended to transfer or did transfer something for nothingY
69 Sup. Ct. 358, 369 (1949).
1. INT. RaV. CODE § 811 "Gross Estate. The value of the gross estate of the decedent
shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real
or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real property situated outside
of the United States....
"(c) Transfers in Contemplation of, or Taking Effect at Death.-To the extent of any
interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
his death, or of which he has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, under
which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference
to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death (1) the
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vision has had a rather celebrated career. Practically all of the eminent Justices of the
Supreme Court at one time or another have lent their talents to its interpretation.
One of the earlier cases interpreting Section 402(c) of the Revenue Act of 1918
(now § 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code) was Shukert v. Allen. 2 In that case
the Commissioner sought to reach property transferred by decedent, when 56 years
of age, to a trustee to accumulate the income for 30 years and then to divide the principal and undistributed income among his three children. Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for the Court was of the opinion that the transfer was "immediate and out and
out", leaving no interest remaining in the testator and that the trust in its terms had
no reference to the testator's death but was the same and unaffected whether he lived
or died.
In Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.3 the decedent settlor had created seven inter
vivos trusts. Two trusts were considered within the scope of the statute on the ground
that the settlor had reserved a power to revoke. In the other five trusts the settlor
had given a pur autre vie interest in income to others, terminable five years after the
death of the settlor. 4 The government's basic position was that the donee's possession
and enjoyment of the corpus waited on the donor's death. Rejecting this contention
the Court said: "In the light of the general purposes of the statute and the language
of § 401 explicitly imposing the tax on net estates of decedents, we think it at least
doubtful whether the trusts or interests in a trust intended to be reached by the
phrase in § 402(c) [now § 811(c)] 'to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after his death' include any others than those passing from the possession, enjoyment
or control of the donor at his death and so taxable as transfers at death under § 401.
That doubt must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer."
A unanimous Court decided in May v. Heineru that property transferred by the
possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or (2) the right,
either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess
or enjoy the property or the income therefrom; except in case of a bona fide sale for
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." For a history of this
provision see 1 PAUL, FEDOLRAL ESTATE AND GrT TAxATioN § 7.06 (1942).
2. 273 U. S. 545 (1927).
3.
4.

278 U. S. 339 (1929).

The remaindermen could also take upon the death of the life tenants none of whom
was the settlor. These trusts were revocable only with the consent of adverse intereststhe beneficiaries. It is to be noted here that the remaindermen could in fact take without
reference to the death of the settlor, but the Court did not base its decision on this factor.
5. 278 U.S. 339, 348 (1929).
6. 281 U. S. 238 (1930). By the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, c. 454, 46 STAT.
1516 (1931), Section 302 (c) of the 1926 Revenue Act was amended in order to tax
transfers under which the decedent had reserved the income of the trust for his life. It
was passed the day after the decisions in Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783 (1931);
Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931) ; and McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S.
784 (1931) all of which followed the rule of May v. Heiner. Since this amendment was
held in Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938), to be purely prospective in its application,
the inclusion of the corpus of such a trust created prior to 1931 in the estate of the
settlor could be accomplished only by considering the original transfer to be one intended
to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or ifter death. That is the holding of
Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 335 U. S. 632 (1949), decided the same day as the
principal case. It overrules the decisions in May v. Heiner and in the three cases set out
in this note above.
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1949]

settlor in trust to pay the income to her spouse for his life and on his death the income to the settlor for her life with remainder to her children should not be included
in the gross estate of the decedent. It had been urged upon the Court that the transfer
was one intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. The
Court held that no interest in the property passed from the decedent at her death,
that title had been definitely fixed by the trust deed, and that the interest that she
possessed in the trust property was obliterated by her death.
In Klein v. United States7 the decedent had conveyed land to his wife, giving her a
life estate, and, upon the contingency that she survive him, the fee. Holding that a
transfer took place at death, the Court said: "It is perfectly plain that the death of
the grantor was the indispensable and intended event which brought the larger estate
into being for the grantee and effected its transmission from the dead to the living. ...."8 The remainder changed at the grantor's death from a contingent to a
vested remainder and the wife could take the remainder only by surviving the grantor.
Then came the St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases.9 In both of these cases the settlors
had expressed themselves so as to grant to the remaindermen vested remainders subject to defeasance should the named beneficiaries predecease the settlors. The Court
held that where the trust property was to revert to the grantor only if he survived the
beneficiary, the transfer was complete when made and was not intended to take effect
at or after decedent's death. A strong dissent was registered in both cases. Mr. Justice Stone writing the dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice (Hughes), and
Justices Brandeis and Cardozo concurred said: "It seems plain that the gift here was
not complete until decedent's death. He did not desire to make a complete gift. He
wished to keep the property for himself in case he survived his daughter.., by using
' 1
a different form of words, he attained the same end and has escaped the tax." 0
was
conthe
majority
facts;
to
the
economic
looking
Justices
were
dissenting
The
cerned with concepts of property law and attempted to ascertain whether the beneficiaries had obtained any larger estate by virtue of the settlor's death: the remainder
had already vested in the beneficiaries at the time of the settlement, and nothing,
therefore, passed to them at the settlor's death. Such a view is, of course, consistent
with the foregoing decisions."
7.

283 U.S. 231 (1931).

8. Id. at 234.
9. Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935) and Becker v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 (1935).
10. Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39, 46, 47 (1935).
11. "The St. Louis Trust decisions restated the existing tenets, and included several
interrelated ideas. Subsection (c) taxes only testamentary gifts; a gift is testamentary
if the given interest 'passes' at the donor's death in a fashion akin to property passng
under a will 'or the laws of intestacy; a given interest does not 'pass' in this manner
unless title to the interest is retained by the donor until death and shifts to the donee
as a result of death. Five years later a new majority was to say that merely 'gossamer
distinctions' separated the Klein and St. Louis Trust cases. But in the realm of ideas familiar
to Mr. justice Sutherland the difference reflected discriminating insight. If a taxable
transfer occurs only when the donor's death 'passes' title to the donee, it is necessarily
significant that the donee's remainder is vested rather than contingent before the donor's
death. It is correlatively insignificant that remainder interests, whether vested or contingent,
happen to be equally defeasible if the donor survives the donee. The paramount consideration is that property law regards a vested remainder, though subject to divestment, as
a 'larger estate' than a contingent remainder. But since subsection (c) refers to the
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Then the dissenting opinion became the law. In 1940 Helvering v. Hallock12 was
decided. Here the settler had given a life estate in the income to his wife; upon her
death the corpus was to revert to the grantor if living; if he were dead then the
remainder was to go to the children of the grantor. The value of the trust corpus
reduced by the outstanding life estate was held to be includible in the gross estate.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in writing the majority opinion said that certiorari had been
granted because of the seeming disharmony of the results of the Klein and the St.
Louis Union Trust Co. cases. In speaking of the Klein case he added that the Court
in that case refused to subordinate the plain purposes of a modem fiscal measure to
the wholly unrelated origins of the recondite learning of ancient property law. 13 Such
technical distinctions of property law as determined the St. Louis cases were no longer
to govern the incidence of the estate tax. Possession and enjoyment were not to be
associated with bare legal title. The economic effects were to rule.
In 1945 the Supreme Court considered the matter of the valuation of the interest
retained by the decedent in a transfer subject to the Hallock rule. In FidelityPhiladelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies14 the decedent transferred in trust property reserving to herself a life estate and granting life estates to her two daughters with
remainder to their descendants; descendants failing, the remainder was to be disposed of according to the grantor's will. The power of appointment was considered
a sufficient retention of interest to render the transfer subject to the tax measured by
the full value of the corpus. "The value of the property subject to the contingency,
rather than the actuarial or theoretical value of the possibility of the occurrence of
the contingency is the measure of the tax."'15 The entire corpus was held taxable in
similar situations in Commissioner v. Field'0 and in Goldstone v. United States.' 7
At somewhat the same time, however, limitations to the application of the Hallock
doctrine were beginning to be recognized. The Solicitor General, in 1944, decided not
to file a petition for certiorari in Lloyd's Estate v. Commissioner.'8 There the third
circuit, in 1944, held a transfer not taxable where the settlor had provided for a
life income for his son with a power of appointment in the son both as to principal
and income; in default of exercise of the power of appointment the corpus to be
distributed to son's wife and descendants according to intestate laws, and if there were
no final takers, the reversion to return to the settlor or his estate. "In the present
case, the settlor's transfers bore no reference whatsoever to his death. He transferred
no interest to anyone contingently upon that event. Whether he lived or died the
trusts were 'the same and unaffected' Shukert v. Allen."' 1 Upon the strength of that
case the Tax Court based its findings in Estate of Biddle v. Commissioner.20 Here
donee's possession or enjoyment, why, the inquisitive may ask, did Mr. Justice Sutherland
refer to the donee's title? The Justice's opinion contained the answer. When subsection (c)
speaks of possession or enjoyment of an interest, it means possession or enjoyment of title
to the interest. A donee who immediately receives title possesses and enjoys title before
and not after the donor dies." Eisenstein, Estate Taxes and the Higher Learning of the
Supreme Court, 3 TAx LAW REviEw 395, 465, 466 (1948).
12. 309 U.S. 106 (1940). See Nash, What Law of Taxation, 9 FORD. L. Rzv. 165 (1940).
13. 309 U.S. 106, 112 (1940).
14. 324 U.S. 108 (1945) (frequently referred to as the Stinson case).
15. Id. at 112.
16. 324 U.S. 113 (1945).
17. 325 U.S. 687 (1945).
61056 (1944).
18. 4 P-H 1944 FED. TAX SERV.
19. 141 F. 2d 758, 762 (C. C. A. 3d 1944) (Italics supplied).
20. 3 T.C. 832 (1944).
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the Commissioner attempted to tax as part of the estate of the decedent property
which he had transferred in trust, providing for a life income to his son, income thereafter to the son's children until they reached certain ages; upon their reaching
these ages, the corpus was to be distributed to them. There was a further proviso that
if the trust failed because of no final takers the property would revert to the settloer's
estate. The basis of the Commissioner's attempt to tax was the possibility of reverter
expressed in the instrument. A full court refused to include the property in the gross
estate. "The principles stated seem to me to call for the result in the present proceeding, as in the Kellogg and Lloyd cases, that these transfers were intended to take
effect at once in all of their immediate and remote aspects and consequently, that
there was no intention, so far as it could be humanly avoided, that any phase of the
arrangement should be postponed until the transferor's death." 21 In the succeeding
year, 1945, the Commissioner's appeal was dismissed.2 2- The Commissioner acquiesced;m and in May of 1946 Treasury Decision 5512 amending Reg. 105 § 81.17
was promulgated.24 These regulations now provide that "Hallock" transfers are
taxable only where in addition to the decedent retaining some right in the property
transferred (such as a reverter), possession or enjoyment of the transferred property
can be olitainable only by beneficiaries who must survive the decedent.25
Although the regulations provide that, given the element of survivorship, even a
reversion by operation of law will suffice to make the trust corpus taxable, the fact
that in the Hallock case the provision for reversion was express resulted in a clear
split among the lower courts on the point. Emphasizing the word "intended" in Section 811 (c) of the Code and the frequently small value of the reversion consequent
upon its remoteness, a number of decisions refused to find in such reversions by pure
operation of law the necessary criteria for inclusion of the corpora.20 Other courts
relentlessly included any corpus having a reversion however remote and though arising
solely by operation of law.2 7
It is reasonably clear that the decision in the principal case has settled any controversy relative to the effect of a possibility of reverter by operation of law in making
the entire corpus of a trust subject to the estate tax. Not only was such an unexpressed reversion involved in the trust in question but the Court in seemingly
unequivocal terms stated that "it is immaterial whether such a present or future
inerest, absolute or contingent, remains in the grantor because he deliberately reserves it or because, without considering the consequences, he conveys away less
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 844.
5 P-H 1945 FED. TAX SERv. g 71105 (1945).
1945 INT.R V. BuL. No. 21 (1945).
1946-1 Cumr. BuL. 264.

25. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17 (1946): " . . . hence the value of Euch pro,-erty
interest is includible in his gross estate, if
(1) possession or enjoyment of the transferred interest can be obtained only by beneficiaries who must survive the decedent, and
(2) the decedent or his estate possesses any right or interest in the property (whether
arising by the express terms of the instrument of transfer or otherwise)."
26. Commissioner v. Kellogg, 119 F. 2d 54 (C.C.A. 3d 1941); Estate of Henry S.
Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943).
27. Commissioner v. Bayne's Estate, 155 F. 2d 475 (C. C.A. 2d 1946); Commissioner
v. Bank of California Nat. Ass'n, 155 F. 2d 1 (C. C. A. 9th 1946). The basis for granting
certiorari in both the Church and the Spiegel cases was the conflict between the two cases
in the Court of Appeals. Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 335 U.S. 632, 636 (1949).
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than all of his property ownership and attributes, present or prospective."
The case would also seem to have laid at rest any doubt as to the possible effect of
remoteness of the reversion or of the relative value of the reversionary right.2 9
While the principal case has thus settled some perplexing problems, it has, nevertheless, raised in the minds of many an equally serious one: must the possession o
enjoyment of the transferred interest be obtainable only by beneficiaries who must
survive the decedent in order to render the property includible in the gross estate?
The opinion in the Spiegel case nowhere mentions this requirement of the regulations. 30 In fact some of its strongest language seems to indicate that the only requirement is the possibility of reverter.3 In addition, the remoteness of the possibility of
reverter and the lack of actual intent on part of the settler were specifically rejected as grounds for excluding the property from the gross estate. These are the
factors which were given importance in certain of the cases which developed the
survivorship rule. The rejection of these factors may imply a rejection of the
survivorship requirement.
It is submitted, nevertheless, that the requirement of survivorship still obtains.
Even in its most apodictical reference to the sufficiency of the possibility of reverter
by operation of law as a basis for inclusion, the Court uses the words "unaffected
by whether the grantor lives or dies." That language is the language of Mr. Justice
Holmes and comes from Shugert v. Allen which held that the property involved was
32
not includible in, the gross estate because of the lack of the survivorship element.
33
Mr.
Justice
Estate
when
v.
Church's
Furthermore in the decision in Commissioner
Black points out a line of cases in the Tax Court and Circuit Court which are about
to be overruled he includes neither the Lloyd nor the Biddle cases discussed above.34
The present decision seems then to stand essentially for the proposition that, where
the facts show that the survivorship requirement is fulfilled, the interest requirement will be considered satisfied by the existence of a possibility of reverter arising
by operation of law, no matter how remote.

28. 335 U.S. 701, 705 (1949).
29. Ibid. As to the remoteness the Court said: "After such a transfer has been made,

the settlor must be left with . . . no possible reversionary interest. . . . " And it is to be
noted that under the circumstances of the trust in question the probability of the decedent
surviving his descendants was but 15 chances in 100,000. On the point of value the court
stated: "But inclusion . . . is not dependent upon the value of the reversionary interest."
335 U.S. 701, 707. The mathematical value of the reversion in this case was $4000 as
compared with a corpus and accumulated income of $1,140,606.30.
30. See note 24 supra, and accompanying text. These "Hallock" regulations were, of
course, not in effect at the time of the transfer or death in the principal case.
31. The Spiegel opinion quotes from the Church opinion (Mr. Justice Black wrote
both): "Hallock thereby returned to the interpretation of the 'possession and enjoyment'
section under which an estate tax cannot be avoided by any trust transfer except by a
bona fide transfer in which the settlor, absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and without
possible reservations, parts with all of his title and all of his possession and all of his
enjoyment of the transferred property. After such a transfer has been made, the settler
must be left with no present legal title in the property, no possible reversionary interest
in that title, and no right to possess or enjoy the property then or thereafter. In other
words such a transfer must be immediate and out and out, and must be unaffected by
whether the grantor lives or dies." 335 U. S. 632, 645 (1949).
32. See note 2 supra, and accompanying text.
33.

335 U.S. 632 (1949).

34. Id. at 636, 637. For the Lloyd and Biddle cases see respectively footnotes 19 and
21 supra together with accompanying text.

